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INTRODUCTION
For Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court, I
authored a feminist revision of the 1873 case of Bradwell v. Illinois,1 in which
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the denial of a license to practice law to Myra
Bradwell—publisher of a highly regarded legal newspaper in Chicago—solely

* Jacob Burns Foundation Professor of Clinical Law, George Washington University Law
School. I extend my gratitude to Professors Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, and Bridget
J. Crawford for instigating and shepherding the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project and inviting
me to rewrite from a feminist perspective the 1873 Supreme Court case of Bradwell v. Illinois.
The insights in this article grew from accepting their invitation. I extend special gratitude to
Linda Berger, who edited my contribution to the Feminist Judgments volume with skill, grace,
and kindness. Thanks also to the Center for Constitutional Law at the University of Akron
School of Law for hosting an invigorating Feminist Judgments symposium in October 2016.
The symposium provided a welcome forum for engaging with others in refining these insights.
1
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1872) (holding that “admission to the bar of a
State of a person who possesses the requisite learning and character” is not a privilege and
immunity of citizenship that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state must grant to a qualified woman).
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on the grounds that she was not a man.2 In rewriting Bradwell, I was bound by
the guidelines of the Feminist Judgments Project that required authors to use the
legal doctrine available at the time.3 Since I was assigned an opinion written in
1873, initially that requirement worried me. But I came to appreciate it, because
it prompted my immersion in the fascinating conceptual world of mid-to-late
nineteenth century America, a time and place rocked by dramatic cultural change
and possibility.4
Since I was writing as a nineteenth century judge—by definition, a man—I
began by reading about law and legal theory in the nineteenth century, in an effort
not only to understand the doctrinal constraints of the era but also to capture the
mindset of an 1870s judge. What were the events, issues, and dynamics that
would be most salient and influential in the thinking of a judge writing at that
time? How would those saliencies affect the judge’s patterns of thought and language? I asked these questions because I wanted my 1873 opinion to be as authentic a ruling as I could make it when writing from my early twenty-first
century vantage point.
Additionally, because I was engaged to write a feminist opinion for
Bradwell, I needed to identify a legal pathway for the decision of an 1870s judge
who believed in principles of equality under law and who cared about women’s
lives and opportunities.5 I soon discovered that my task was not as creative as I
first expected. To the contrary, I found that in the 1870s there was a sturdy legal
architecture to support women’s equality, that there were vibrant equality movements articulating sound legal arguments, and that Myra Bradwell was not just a
woman who wanted to be a lawyer but also a participant in those movements.6
Once my research brought the legal and political world of the nineteenth
century into sharper relief, I saw vividly how much the arguments for women’s
2

See Phyllis Goldfarb, Judgment: Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873), in FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS 60, 60 (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016)
[hereinafter FEMINIST JUDGMENTS].
3
See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to the U.S.
Feminist Judgments Project, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 9 (“To make the point
that law may be driven by perspective as much as stare decisis, it was critical that the feminist
justices be bound, just as the original justices were, to the law and precedent in effect at the
time.”).
4
For a masterful examination of the tumult of the Reconstruction era following the devastation of the Civil War, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at xxv (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988)
(“[Reconstruction] produced a sweeping redefinition of the nation’s public life and a violent
reaction that ultimately destroyed much, but by no means all, of what had been accomplished.”).
5
See Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Talking Back: From Feminist History and Theory
to Feminist Legal Methods and Judgments, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 25 (“Despite varied meanings and diverse participants, feminisms throughout time have sought to better the conditions of women’s lives, to advocate for the rights of women, to pursue women’s
equality, and to liberate women and all sexes from cultural, legal, social, economic, and political subordination.”).
6
See infra notes 32–122 and accompanying text.
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equality in the 1870s were connected to the issues and dynamics surrounding
slavery, abolition, and the Civil War.7 The ways they were connected were interesting and complicated, embedded in one gripping historical narrative after another. In this Article, proceeding in three parts, I will share some of these
nineteenth century narratives, analyze them, and try to pull some of their lessons
into the twenty-first century.
In Part I of this Article, I describe the relevant legal backdrop to Bradwell,
the intertwined arguments of the Reconstruction-era movements for racial justice
and gender justice, and the partial perspectives of the jurists deciding how to
allocate rights and entitlements under the new constitutional mandates that followed the end of the Civil War.8 In Part II, I examine the relevant political backdrop to Bradwell’s claims and describe how law and politics intersected in battles
over the meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments, most notably Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires states to protect all Americans’
privileges or immunities of citizenship.9 In Part III, I seek to extract timeless
lessons for twenty-first century anti-subordination movements from the rich narratives and analyses evoked by the nineteenth century movement for women’s
equality.10
I.   DECLARING PARTIAL LAW
A.   The Road Not Taken
One of the first insights revealed by my time travel was this: We could have
had women’s formal equality under law a century before Reed v. Reed outlawed
sex discrimination.11 A significant part of the reason that the nineteenth century
ended before women’s formal equality began was that courts refused to adopt
what I now view as the best understandings of constitutional requirements in
1873.12 This result was not accidental but structural. The fact that all courts, by

7

See infra notes 32–50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 11–50 and accompanying text.
9
See infra notes 51–170 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 171–218 and accompanying text.
11
See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (holding that an Idaho statute’s sex classification
giving mandatory preferences to males as estate administrators violates equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
12
The groundwork for the Court’s rejection of Bradwell’s argument was laid in the SlaughterHouse Cases. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 53–55 (1872) (adopting a restrictive
interpretation of the privileges and immunities of citizenship in denying relief to a group of
independent butchers whose livelihoods were impeded by a Louisiana statute creating a
slaughterhouse monopoly). See generally John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1430–33 (1992) (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the Fourteenth Amendment’s foremost guarantee of equality because, unlike
the Equal Protection Clause, it addresses which laws can be made and enforced).
8
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definition and design, were staffed by judges who were beneficiaries of the structural inequalities whose legalities they were determining is not beside the point
but likely is one of the central points itself.13
If some number of the justices had acknowledged that their own perspectives
were affected or skewed by their role as beneficiaries of the prevailing hierarchies, and tried to correct for the biases that this reality inevitably produced when
these hierarchies were challenged under law, the constitutional perspective I articulated in Bradwell might have been represented on the Supreme Court bench
in the 1870s.14 Had that occurred, the law might have developed quite differently—not only for women but for other subordinated classes as well—over subsequent generations to the present day.15 If the strong legal arguments presented
during the first wave of feminism had met more success, the second wave of
feminism might have unfolded very differently and confronted different challenges.16 While it is impossible to truly re-imagine the world that might have
emerged from this counterfactual history, at the very least it does seem that Pauli
Murray would not have needed to devise the equal protection strategy that she
articulated in Jane Crow and the Law,17 and Ruth Bader Ginsburg would have
found other valuable pursuits for the American Civil Liberties Union’s Women’s

13

See Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench Mean for Justice?, 6 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 113, 130, 148 (1999) (stating that although research on diversity’s effect on
justice “has been hampered in the past by the small number of non-white male judges,” some
recent studies indicate that “the diversity they bring to the bench has an actual effect on the
outcome of cases”).
14
See Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1217 (1992) (arguing that
impartial judging involves awareness of one’s own perspectives and a sufficiently open mind
to learn from other points of view, thereby avoiding the risk of “leaving unexamined the very
assumptions that deserve reconsideration”); see also JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA’S FIRST
WOMAN LAWYER: THE BIOGRAPHY OF MYRA BRADWELL 22 (1993) (stating that in the 1870s,
“the specter of nationwide woman’s suffrage” was “terrifying”).
15
See Minow, supra note 14, at 1206 (“[T]he Court’s impartiality is threatened if it appears,
because of its own narrow membership, to lack an understanding of the broad range of people
who come before it.”).
16
The first wave of feminism is typically understood as spanning the nineteenth century
women’s rights movement and continuing through the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment
in 1920. The second wave of feminism is understood as the women’s rights movement of the
late twentieth century. Some suggest that feminism is currently experiencing a third wave. See
RORY DICKER, A HISTORY OF U.S. FEMINISMS 103 (2008) (“[I]t is relatively easy to locate the
origins of the first and second waves of the women’s movement . . . the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848 . . . for the first wave and . . . the Miss America protest in 1968 for the second—
finding a beginning moment for the third wave . . . [is] more complicated.”).
17
Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title
VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 235–42 (1965) (delineating a set of legal arguments for establishing formal gender equality under law through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Rights Project besides adopting Murray’s legal blueprint and litigating cases to
establish simple formal equality under law on the basis of sex.18
Unfortunately, we inherited the unequal world that we did, in part because
the judges of the 1870s did not understand their own partiality. In the world they
knew, privileged white men had always been entrusted with shaping the rules
and deciding the fates of all others, including women and African-Americans.19
In that respect, the fate of privileged white women like Myra Bradwell resembled
that of African-American men and women, most of whom had just been released,
penniless and despised, from more than two centuries of race-based chattel slavery.20
B.   Interactive Activism
Although the conditions of life for each group varied profoundly, developments in American history, including American legal history, linked the fates of
those experiencing discrimination on the basis of race and those experiencing
discrimination on the basis of gender.21 While the relevant sets of discriminatory

18

See Neil A. Lewis, The Supreme Court: Woman in the News; Rejected as a Clerk, Chosen
as a Justice: Ruth Joan Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/15/us/supreme-court-woman-rejected-clerk-chosen-justice-ruth-joan-bader-ginsburg.html [https://perma.cc/KU6B-9F8N] (“As the director of the Women’s Rights
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, Ms. Ginsburg adopted a strategy intended to
convince the Justices that laws that discriminated between men and women—even those laws
that were meant to help women—were based on unfair and harmful stereotypes and were in
most cases unconstitutional.”).
19
See NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 4 (1987) (defining the equality
concerns of feminism as “opposition to one sex’s categorical control of the rights and opportunities of the other”); see also CATHERINE CLINTON, THE OTHER CIVIL WAR: AMERICAN
WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 76 (1984) (quoting the platform of an 1851 women’s
rights conference as rejecting “the right of any portion of the species to decide for another
portion . . . what is and what is not their ‘proper sphere’: that the proper sphere for all human
beings is the largest and highest to which they are able to attain”); DICKER, supra note 16, at
25 (describing the “constrained social roles available to women” in the nineteenth century,
such that early feminists “advocated women’s access to education and jobs”).
20
Many nineteenth century feminists like Elizabeth Cady Stanton compared the patriarchal
authority that constrained women’s freedom to the condition of slavery. See CLINTON, supra
note 19, at 70 (quoting Stanton as saying that unlike the white man “born to do whatever he
can, for the woman and the negro there is no such privilege”).
21
Id. (“[W]omen abolitionists were formidable opponents in the moral war against slavery. . . .
[W]omen turned these egalitarian sentiments for blacks into the basis for a ‘holy war’ for
themselves.”). Of course, women of color experienced the interaction of race and gender discrimination. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 1, 7
(Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003) (“[W]omen of color are not merely white women
plus color or men of color plus gender. Instead, their identities must be multiplied together to
create a holistic One when analyzing the nature of the discrimination against them.”) (footnote
omitted).

17 NEV. L.J. 565, GOLDFARB - FINAL.DOCX

5/10/17 12:11 PM

570

[Vol. 17:565

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

practices diverged dramatically for these groups, challenges to each set of practices were legally linked.22 Prospects for successful legal challenges depended
on making similar claims, which were grounded in similar understandings of
democratic equality, federal-state power relations, and the post-Civil War legal
structure.23
Consequently, the theory and practice of the major anti-subordination movements of the nineteenth century overlapped significantly. There were many types
of overlap, including people involved in both movements.24 Many Northern
white women, assigned by nineteenth century gender ideology to the domestic
sphere, first developed self-identities as public actors in the movement to abolish
slavery.25 Their public roles expanded during the Civil War, as they participated
in war relief efforts and took over civic and commercial activities in place of men
gone to battlefields.26 At war’s end, some women became active in federal government efforts during Reconstruction, including the Freedmen’s Bureau, while
others traveled South as teachers to participate in literacy education for the millions of people newly freed from slavery’s deprivations.27
Many of the women who participated, in ways large and small, in remaking
American society before and after the Civil War had internalized the egalitarian
rhetoric of the era, seeing its application not only to the lives of freed slaves but
to their own lives as well.28 They glimpsed a future in which full “citizenship”
rights—their conceptual category for the entitlements due to all inhabitants of a

22

DICKER, supra note 16, at 39 (“At the end of the war, abolitionists and women’s rights
activists formed the American Equal Rights Association (AERA), whose goal was to gain civil
rights for both black people and [white] women.”).
23
See infra notes 32–50 and accompanying text.
24
See CLINTON, supra note 19, at 54 (“Female moral reformers and abolitionists were mainstays of the antebellum women’s movement.”).
25
Id. at 71–72 (“[F]emale participation was not only substantial but essential to bringing the
slavery issue to the forefront of sectional politics. . . . [T]he fight to free slaves propelled
women into an equally long, rigorous fight for their own liberation. . . . [M]ost feminists acquired public-speaking skills in the antislavery forum.”).
26
Id. at 81 (“When war broke out, it was easy for the government to draw on middle-class
women’s talent and experience on behalf of war relief. . . . Women used many of the innovations developed during the antislavery days, such as the sponsoring of fairs and bazaars, to
raise funds.”); id. at 92 (“The war gave many unparalleled opportunities to explore new fields
and to pioneer on behalf of their sex. . . . afford[ing] access to jobs which [white women] were
denied in peacetime.”).
27
Id. at 88 (“[N]orthern women . . . serve[d] in the South, to fill positions with the newly
established Freedmen’s Bureau. . . . to assist freed blacks . . . . By 1869 there were nine thousand teachers for ex-slaves in the South, and nearly half were women.”).
28
See JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 123–24 (1983) (“[L]egislation
on the basis of woman’s traditional role in the family amounts to a role assignment by the
dominant members of society for their own convenience, and that sounds suspiciously like
slavery. If slavery for blacks was odious, so is pseudo-slavery for women.”).
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democratic republic—belong not just to white men but equally to all people, regardless of race, gender, or class.29 These ideas took their most organized form
in the women’s suffrage movement, though its claims for civil and political rights
went well beyond attaining the franchise.30 Former slaves and African-American
activists, such as Frederick Douglass and Ida B. Wells-Barnett, were also involved in the movement for women’s suffrage.31
C.   Interlocking Legal Theories
An important path towards equality forged by nineteenth century activists
pursuing both race and gender justice was a legal theory rooted in constitutional
design. The theory began with the awareness that in establishing America’s foundational principles as a republic, the Declaration of Independence had declared
a human rights principle as a self-evident truth: that all were created equal and
that by virtue of their fundamental equality, all people were entitled to inalienable rights.32 Of course, colonial and antebellum practices—most notably, slavery
and coverture—contradicted this anti-subordination philosophy, but nineteenth
century equality theorists did not view these practices as undermining the Constitution’s true meaning.33
In fact, powerful factions of the anti-slavery movement expressed claims in
the idiom of constitutionalism. These abolitionists challenged the constitutionality of slavery with the argument that the egalitarian language of the Declaration
29

See Norma Basch, Reconstructing Female Citizenship: Minor v. Happersett, in THE
CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE 52, 52 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992) (“As black
codes menaced the viability of black citizenship and promoted efforts to define and guarantee
citizenship through constitutional amendments, the amendments, in turn, unleashed a long and
arduous struggle over the terms of female citizenship.”).
30
The Declaration of Sentiments, drafted by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and her colleagues who
attended the first women’s convention at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848, listed numerous
grievances and resolutions, one of which was “the duty of the women of this country to secure
to themselves their sacred right to the elective franchise.” RICHARD CHUSED & WENDY
WILLIAMS, GENDERED LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 92 (2016). In the nineteenth century, the
women’s movement was known as “the woman movement.” See COTT, supra note 19, at 3
(“Nineteenth-century women’s consistent usage of the singular woman symbolized, in a word,
the unity of the female sex.”).
31
Frederick Douglass, who attended the Seneca Falls Convention and was the only man at
the convention to speak on behalf of women’s suffrage, persuaded Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
who was initially reluctant to do so, to include suffrage in the list of resolutions. See PAULA
GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER 126 (1984). Ida B. Wells-Barnett founded a black
women’s suffrage organization, and was an associate of Susan B. Anthony’s. Id. at 120, 125
(“Wells-Barnett and Anthony would have long discussions about the race and women’s issues.”).
32
See GARRETT EPPS, AMERICAN EPIC 141 (2013) (“The Framers all more or less subscribed
to the idea Jefferson phrased memorably in the Declaration of Independence: ‘that all men . . .
are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights.’ ”).
33
See BAER, supra note 28, at 64 (quoting John Bingham, principal drafter of the Fourteenth
Amendment, who observed that “[t]he equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know;
to argue and to utter, according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of their toil, is
the rock on which that Constitution rests”).
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of Independence, the document that established the principles that launched the
nation, was incorporated into the Constitution, the document that established the
nation’s rules of operation.34 Despite the fact that slavery is not prohibited by the
text of the original Constitution—because the political realities of forming a union of free and slave states in 1787 could not accommodate such a prohibition—
some abolitionists argued that the Declaration’s equality principles imbued the
spirit of the Constitution.35 It could not be otherwise, their argument ran, because
our two national blueprints could not be inconsistent.36 The egalitarian spirit necessary to each simply became more explicit as a constitutional principle once the
Reconstruction Amendments were adopted.37 Echoing the Declaration, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment made equality—inchoate and contested
as its meaning was—a universal entitlement of American citizenship.38
Consequently, by the 1870s, the legal theory of equal justice for both African-Americans and white women rested on a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, understood at the time as explicitly translating the central equality premise
of the Declaration of Independence into the constitutional text.39 The language
of the Amendment was inclusive, proclaiming that citizens of the states were also
federal citizens who had privileges and immunities by virtue of their status as
Americans.40 As a result, the federal government was obliged to protect their
broad rights as national citizens—which included the rights to due process and
equal protection of the laws—by limiting any state’s abrogation of these national
citizenship rights.41

34

Id. at 62 (“Not only was the Declaration, in effect, part of the Constitution, but, a fortiori,
so were the principles of natural law which it expressed. Men were equal, and endowed with
rights, under the United States Constitution; therefore, slavery violated it.”).
35
Id. (quoting an abolitionist who testified to Congress in 1836 that “slavery makes war upon
the principles of the Declaration, and the spirit of the Constitution”).
36
Id. at 60–61 (describing the abolitionist view that “the Constitution already forbade slavery”
because its text had to be interpreted “to incorporate, or at the very least not to traduce, the
ideas of the Declaration”).
37
Id. at 64 (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment was “conceived of as ‘declaratory’ of
what was already in the Constitution”).
38
Id. at 102–04 (arguing that congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment suggest
that the Amendment is grounded in “a notion of equality [under law] based on natural entitlement [of human beings] to rights, derived from the Declaration” and intended to protect all
American citizens from oppression).
39
See Basch, supra note 29, at 53 (“[T]he spacious terms of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment carried a new, albeit ambiguous, promise of legal and constitutional equality.”).
40
Id. (“In gender-neutral language [the Fourteenth Amendment] prohibited states from denying any person equal protection of the laws or abridging the privileges and immunities of U.S.
citizens.”).
41
See Thurgood Marshall, Essay, The Constitution’s Bicentennial: Commemorating the
Wrong Document?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1340–41 (1987) (“[After the Civil War] arose a
new, more promising basis for justice and equality, the fourteenth amendment, ensuring protection of the life, liberty, and property of all persons against deprivations without due process,
and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”).
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Not surprising in the wake of the secession and treason of the slave states
that had galvanized the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment accorded the federal government power over states in protecting individual freedom.42 While the
colonists at the time of the Revolutionary War may have been most concerned
with the tyranny of centralized power like the monarchy they were overthrowing,
Americans by the time of the Civil War vividly discerned the problem created
by the tyranny of a state’s decentralized power as well.43 Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment clarified that, as a constitutional matter, the states had to protect the rights of their citizens just as the federal government was required to
do.44 Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment clarified the power of Congress to
pass federal legislation that enforced all citizens’ Fourteenth Amendment
rights.45
After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the women’s
suffrage movement argued that Section One granted women full national citizenship, with all its entitlements, just as the Reconstruction Amendments granted
full national citizenship—at least in theory—to African-American men.46 Unfortunately, when women like Myra Bradwell asked courts to uphold the robust legal protections embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s language, most judges
rejected the arguments.47 The perceived link between Bradwell’s asserted right
under the Constitution to a profession of her choosing and the highly contentious
issue of women’s right to suffrage created a volatile context for fair adjudication

42

See EPPS, supra note 32, at 169 (“[T]he new nation that emerged from the Civil War could
not exist as a self-governing, democratic republic without strong federal monitoring of individual rights.”).
43
Id. at 158 (“[T]he Fourteenth [Amendment] radically alters the structure of the government
created in 1787 . . . .”); see also Rogers M. Smith, “One United People”: Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 229, 229
(1989) (explaining that Americans replaced “English subjectship with the particular political
status they created, citizenship in a commercial republic guaranteeing various personal, economic, and intellectual freedoms”); id. at 239 (describing Revolutionary War views of states
as a bulwark against “potentially despotic central government” that provided “a frequent, effective shield for state and local oppressions against women and other unempowered groups,”
the problem which the Reconstruction Amendments sought to address).
44
See EPPS, supra note 32, at 168 (“[The Fourteenth Amendment] indicates that states must
respect the same limits as the federal government when they deal with any American citizen,
their own citizens or not.”).
45
Id. at 181 (“Section Five . . . points to Congress as the enforcer of all four sections [of the
Fourteenth Amendment],” giving Congress “the power, ‘by appropriate legislation,’ to enforce
the amendment.”).
46
See Ellen Carol DuBois, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Bradwell, Minor, and Suffrage Militance in the 1870s, in VISIBLE WOMEN 19, 22 (Nancy A. Hewitt & Suzanne Lebsock
eds., 1993) (elaborating the suffragists’ argument that “national citizenship had finally been
established as supreme by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and that “the benefits of national citizenship were equally the rights of all”).
47
See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1872) (holding by a vote of 8–1 that a qualified woman’s choice to enter the profession of law is not a privilege of national citizenship
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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of her claims.48 Similarly, the link between arguments for broad construction of
the Fourteenth Amendment made on behalf of women’s rights activists and those
made on behalf of freed African-American slaves tapped into a roiling controversy that impeded impartial and independent consideration of Bradwell’s arguments.49 Many among the powers-that-be sought to limit and control the societal
reconstruction that the Civil War had necessitated.50
II.   RE-CONSTITUTING AMERICA: LAW AND POLITICS IN FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A.   HerStory and History
The cultural and legal conflicts that influenced Bradwell’s case had pervaded
her life from the start.51 Born into an active abolitionist family, Myra Bradwell
was likely familiar with the constitutional vision of equality that characterized
the anti-slavery movement.52 This vision may have influenced her thinking during the Civil War when she was involved with other women in war relief and
substantial fundraising efforts for wartime medical care.53 The combination of a
constitutional vision of universal citizenship rights and women’s increased involvement in civic activities foreshadowed Bradwell’s decision to apply for a
license to practice law.54 Her decision to do so enabled her to make a case for

48

See DuBois, supra note 46, at 23–25 (describing the Fourteenth Amendment arguments
made by the suffragists as “militant” and “activist,” because their “basic message was that the
vote was already women’s right; they merely had to take it,” leading to numerous examples of
“women’s direct action voting” between 1868–72); see also CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note
30, at 857 (“In many ways, [Bradwell’s] case encapsulated the history of the post-War suffrage
movement.”).
49
See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 864 (“Though her brief was a bit vague,
Bradwell was presumably arguing that the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment established protections for women as well as freed slaves.”).
50
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 32 (stating that after the Presidential election of 1872, the
Republican Party “retreat[ed] from the radical implications of the postwar amendments”); see
also BAER, supra note 28, at 105 (“The promises of Reconstruction were not kept.”).
51
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 35 (stating that though “little is known about Myra’s
childhood . . . . [b]oth of her parents were prominent in the antislavery movement”).
52
Id. (noting that Bradwell’s parents were “close friends of the family of Elijah Lovejoy, a
newspaper publisher and staunch abolitionist who was murdered . . . by a proslavery mob”
and that Myra’s friend Owen Lovejoy, Elijah’s brother, “frequently” told Myra the “story of
Lovejoy’s role in the abolitionist struggle”); see also JILL NORGREN, REBELS AT THE BAR 39
(2013) (observing that in 1870, “[c]itizenship and political rights were very much on
Bradwell’s mind”).
53
During the war, Myra Bradwell was exceptionally active in fundraising and other war relief
efforts, serving as president of the Chicago Soldiers’ Aid Society. See FRIEDMAN, supra note
14, at 42 (indicating that Bradwell “became intensely involved in a number of women’s philanthropic organizations that had been formed for the purpose of raising money for the Union
Army’s sick and wounded soldiers and their families”).
54
Bradwell’s application to the Illinois bar was submitted approximately six weeks after the
first woman in the country was admitted to the bar—Arabella Mansfield in the state of Iowa.
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women’s rights and opportunities while lending support to their professional ambitions.55
After reading law in her husband’s law office and passing the state bar exam
with high honors,56 Bradwell founded the Chicago Legal News, a respected
weekly newspaper for the legal profession.57 With the success and demands of
her growing publishing business, it is unclear whether she actually intended to
practice law, but there is no question that she was qualified to become a member
of the bar.58 When Illinois denied her application solely on the ground that she
was a woman, she appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.59
Some of Bradwell’s able appellate arguments in support of her admission
were grounded in state law, such as: (1) the absence of an express statutory provision prohibiting women from becoming lawyers in Illinois; (2) the directive in
a state statutory instruction to construe the word “he” to mean “he or she”; and
(3) the revisions in state law that had undermined the disabilities that accompanied coverture and permitted her to make her own contracts and retain her own
earnings.60 But after the heavily publicized ratification process of the ballyhooed
Reconstruction Amendments, she added to her state law arguments a claim that
the state’s refusal on the grounds of gender to grant her membership in the bar
denied her a privilege of citizenship—the right to choose a livelihood—that she

Id. at 18 (stating that “Mansfield was a teacher of English and history who had no intention of
practicing law” but her admission was part of a plan devised to promote women’s equality).
55
Id. at 20 (In her brief to the Illinois Supreme Court challenging the denial of her admission
to the bar, Bradwell cited changes in state law granting women social and economic rights,
reported on the admission of some women to law schools, and “discussed the recent opening
to women of other trades and occupations from which they had previously been barred.”).
56
Id. at 18.
57
See NORGREN, supra note 52, at 30 (“It was . . . Myra’s genius to . . . use her training in law
as well as [her] management skills acquired during the war to build a national publishing empire specializing in legal materials. . . . [T]he Chicago Legal News . . . would make her wealthy
while providing a place for the advocacy of women’s rights.”).
58
Id. at 28, 37–38 (stating although once Myra might have wished to enter the bar to help her
husband in his law practice, the subsequent success of her publishing business suggested that
“[f]or Bradwell, bar admission would be a personal and political victory, reinforcing women
in their professional ambitions and quest for rights”).
59
Initially the Illinois Supreme Court rejected her bar application because she was a married
woman. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 18–19 (quoting the letter Bradwell first received
from the court’s reporter stating that she was denied bar membership because “you would not
be bound by the [contractual] obligations necessary to be assumed where the relation of attorney and client shall exist, by reason of the disability imposed by your married condition”)
(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). But when Myra challenged this decision, arguing
in part that Illinois statutes had recently removed some of the historical legal disabilities for
married women, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that denial of Bradwell’s bar application
was based not on her status as a married woman but simply on her status as a woman. Id. at
20.
60
See Nancy T. Gilliam, A Professional Pioneer: Myra Bradwell’s Fight to Practice Law, 5
L. & HIST. REV. 105, 109–10 (1987) (delineating Bradwell’s state law arguments).
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was guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.61 When the Illinois Supreme
Court denied all her arguments, she petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for its first interpretation of the meaning of the brand new Fourteenth Amendment.62
B.   The Nineteenth Century’s (Un)Popular Constitutionalism
The constitutional arguments that Bradwell would advance at the Supreme
Court were gathering steam among nineteenth century activists. In 1869, Francis
and Virginia Minor, a lawyer-husband and suffragist-wife team living in Missouri, developed a sophisticated constitutional argument for women’s equality
with men as autonomous political actors.63 Although the specific version of their
argument that addressed women’s suffrage would reach the Supreme Court after
Bradwell’s case, their general constitutional arguments for women’s rights had
been shared in women’s suffrage gatherings and publications, where Bradwell
likely encountered them and later incorporated them into the litigation challenging her exclusion from the profession of law.64 Therefore, although Bradwell

61

Id. at 114 (stating that on December 31, 1869, Bradwell filed in the Illinois Supreme Court
a document containing two constitutional arguments, “an undeveloped equal rights claim and
a privileges and immunities argument”).
62
Id. at 116–17 (“Because this was the first examination by the Supreme Court of the meaning
of the Civil War amendments . . . [t]he issue is usually phrased thusly: Did the fourteenth
amendment bring about a radical change in the balance of power between the state and federal
governments?”).
63
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 21–22 (noting that in October 1869, Francis and Virginia
Minor presented the women’s suffrage movement with “an elaborate and elegant interpretation of the Constitution” for advancing women’s rights, including the right to vote).
64
The Minors’ constitutional argument for women’s suffrage was rejected by a unanimous
Supreme Court. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (holding that suffrage was not
a protected right of citizenship guaranteed to women by the Fourteenth Amendment). Myra
Bradwell was “one of the Midwest’s preeminent suffragists,” whose efforts on behalf of the
women’s suffrage movement were “substantial.” See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 167.
Bradwell served as corresponding secretary of the women’s suffrage convention held in Cleveland in November 1869, where the Minors’ argument was likely discussed. Id. at 170–71. The
convention had been called by Lucy Stone to organize the American Woman Suffrage Association for suffragists who, unlike Stanton and Anthony, did not oppose the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 169–70. In January, 1869, the National Woman Suffrage Association adopted a
resolution stating that women’s disenfranchisement violated the privileges and immunities of
citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Basch, supra note 29, at 53–54. In
January, 1870, Francis Minor published a letter indicating that the legal strategy he had developed with his wife was presented as a resolution at the Missouri National Woman Suffrage
Association, where Virginia Minor was the president. Id. at 59. Serving as an officer in the
American Woman Suffrage Association and a member of the executive committee of the Illinois State Suffrage Association, and keeping abreast of developments in the struggle for
woman suffrage for her newspaper, Bradwell undoubtedly was aware of the constitutional
interpretations emerging at that time from the suffragists’ movement. See FRIEDMAN, supra
note 14, at 176–77 (stating that Bradwell not only served as an officer of suffrage organizations, she also reported frequently on the organizations’ activities).
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may have been the lone plaintiff in her case, she represented the hopes of swelling numbers of nineteenth century women who sought autonomy, choice, and
larger civic and political roles.65
The contested question of the hour was whether all American citizens would
be entrusted with full and equal rights of citizenship. Bradwell understood that
her case would bear broadly and directly on women’s civil and political rights,
including the right to suffrage, which women had been pressing to attain for a
number of years.66 A victory in her case before the Supreme Court that recognized women’s citizenship rights might encompass women’s right to the franchise as well.67 What Bradwell may not have foreseen was that from 1869–73,
the protracted period during which her case was awaiting the Supreme Court’s
decision, the political climate would become increasingly belligerent and the actual legal issues in her case would be overshadowed by the intensifying dynamics
of Reconstruction and women’s suffrage to which they were conceptually tied.68
Bradwell’s legal issues were substantial. The Minors’ argument from which
she borrowed was centered on the Fourteenth Amendment, but it also drew from
across the Constitution.69 The language of Article IV, Section Four of the Constitution provided that the “United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government.”70 To disenfranchised women—half
the country’s citizens deprived of a political voice—the form of government they
experienced, according to the Minors, was not republicanism but despotism.71

65

FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 164 (noting that Bradwell engaged in numerous endeavors to
“secure occupational and professional freedom for all women”); see also NORGREN, supra
note 52, at 40 (“Bradwell was one of several activists gamely making [the Fourteenth Amendment argument framed by the Minors] and devising strategy to make it a reality.”).
66
See NORGREN, supra note 52, at 39–40 (“The failure of the women’s movement to win . . .
explicit inclusion of women’s rights in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments . . . led
Bradwell to hope that her case might result in a sweeping judicial decision supporting
women’s status as full citizens, with all of the rights and privileges of that status.”).
67
The reverse was also true. After the Illinois Supreme Court denied her application to the
bar, Bradwell saw its broad adverse implications for women’s rights. See FRIEDMAN, supra
note 14, at 21 (Bradwell wrote in her newspaper that the Illinois court’s decision to uphold
denial of her application to the bar was “to the political rights of women in Illinois” what the
U. S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott was “to the rights of the negroes as citizens of
the U.S.”—“annihilation.”) (quoting Myra Bradwell, Opinion, A Woman Cannot Practice
Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 5, 1870, at 146–47).
68
See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 107 (labeling this general time period “a most turbulent era”
following “disunion and civil war” and the “spectacular political upheaval of Reconstruction,”
as well as the upheaval created by women’s suffrage activism); see also DuBois, supra note
46, at 23–32 (“By 1871 hundreds of women were trying to register and vote in dozens of towns
all over the country,” and Susan B. Anthony was arrested and convicted for voting in 1872);
Basch, supra note 29, at 57 (stating that in the 1870s, as the viability of women’s suffrage
increased, its prospect “[was] met with savage derision in the press”).
69
See Basch, supra note 29, at 59–61 (detailing the Minors’ constitutional arguments).
70
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
71
See Basch, supra note 29, at 61 (“Implicit here was the claim that unless public authority—
in this case the Supreme Court—reconstructed female citizenship to encompass suffrage, it
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From this perspective, denying women political rights amounted to abandoning
a fundamental principle of the Declaration of Independence, that “governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.”72 When Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment clarified that all Americans were entitled to the
privileges or immunities of citizenship, its terms confirmed the equal rights of
all citizens, including women, under the overall constitutional structure.73
Drawing on this Fourteenth Amendment argument, Bradwell petitioned the
Supreme Court to hear her case in 1870.74 Shortly thereafter, a Fourteenth
Amendment argument similar to Bradwell’s and supportive of the rights of
women was advanced in the November 1870 issue of Woodhull & Claflin’s
Weekly, a newspaper published by charismatic activist Victoria Woodhull.75 In
January 1871, Congressman Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts invited Woodhull to address the combined Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate
about her interpretation of women’s constitutional rights.76 Drawing from the
Minors’ constitutional arguments, Woodhull—the first woman to testify before
Congress—told the assembled Congressmen that the language of Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment established the supremacy of national citizenship
over state citizenship and accorded all rights of citizenship without regard to
sex.77 Since the foremost right of citizenship was the right to vote, the Fourteenth
Amendment secured the franchise for women, and the federal government was
obliged to protect the franchise for all its citizens, male and female, along with
all other civil and political rights.78 Woodhull urged Congress to pass enabling
had no legitimacy because it reflected not a republican form of government, but rather ‘despotism.’ ”).
72
Id. (“Either we give up a fundamental principle of our government . . . that ‘governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,’ or we acknowledge the legitimacy
of the plaintiff’s claim.”).
73
Id. at 60 (describing the Minors’ argument that the original Constitution protected women’s
right to vote, that women’s disenfranchisement “was the result of a monumental misreading
of the original text,” and that the Fourteenth Amendment “merely obliterated any remaining
doubts on the subject”).
74
See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 116 (“The progression to the federal court in 1870 was made
promptly after the Illinois record was prepared for transmission.”).
75
See NORGREN, supra note 52, at 40 (“Victoria Woodhull brought this idea to the public in
a November 19, 1870 article in her newspaper, Woodhull & Claflin’s Weekly . . . .”).
76
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 26 (“In January of 1871 Woodhull appeared before the House
Judiciary Committee to make the constitutional case for women’s right to vote. . . . Her appearance was sponsored by Massachusetts Republican Benjamin Butler . . . .”).
77
Id. (“No woman had ever before been invited to address a committee of the U.S. Congress. . . . Like the Minors, Woodhull argued that the Fourteenth Amendment established the
supremacy of national over state citizenship and the obligation of the federal government to
protect the rights of all citizens equally.”).
78
Id. (“[W]omen along with men were citizens of the United States, and foremost among the
‘privileges and immunities’ of national citizenship was the right to vote.”); see also Steven G.
Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15, 70
(2011) (observing that “[a]nyone who has equal political rights must by definition also have
equal civil rights” because throughout American history “if a class had political rights, it would
be guaranteed full civil rights”).
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legislation that clarified and enforced women’s right to suffrage under the Fourteenth Amendment.79
When Elizabeth Cady Stanton called the Minor-Woodhull argument a “new
departure” for the women’s suffrage movement, the constitutional interpretation
it advanced became known as the movement’s New Departure strategy.80 Congress subsequently issued two reports in response to Woodhull’s New Departure
arguments.81 A Majority Report rejected the interpretations she had articulated,
and a Minority Report accepted her broad vision of the Fourteenth Amendment.82
With a significant number of supporters in Congress, suffragists began lobbying
for adoption of the interpretations framed in the Minority Report.83 Fear of their
potential success rallied the opposition.
Concerned about the increasing traction of the New Departure position, including the version before the Supreme Court in Bradwell’s case, opponents
sought to discredit it through a not unfamiliar political tactic.84 They smeared the
messenger, accusing Woodhull of espousing “free love”—an accusation she did
not deny—and they cast related reputational aspersions on suffragists who allied
with her.85 During Reconstruction, the politics of inclusionary democracy were
sufficiently frightening to some that they resorted to extraordinary and questionable means to hold back the forces of change.86
While Woodhull’s position was being weakened through its association with
defiance of sexual norms, a widespread grassroots movement, persuaded by the
New Departure’s suffrage rhetoric, determined that women should begin voting
79

See DuBois, supra note 46, at 26 (stating that Woodhull “asked Congress to pass legislation
clarifying the right of all women to vote under the new Reconstruction amendments”).
80
See NORGREN, supra note 52, at 40 (“Elizabeth Cady Stanton declared that the Minor/Woodhull argument amounted to a ‘new departure,’ radically changing the ‘manner of
agitation.’ The supporters of the ‘New Departure’ . . . called for a strategy of federal enabling
legislation in support of Minor’s theory and Supreme Court decisions built on Minor’s reasoning.”).
81
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 27 (“The House Judiciary Committee issued two conflicting
reports on the constitutional issues [Woodhull] raised.”).
82
Id. (“ ‘Thus it can be seen,’ Woodhull observed archly, ‘that equally able men differ upon
a simple point of Constitutional Law.’ ”).
83
Id. (“In 1871 two committee rooms in the Capitol were put at the disposal of the suffragists
to facilitate their lobbying efforts.”).
84
See NORGREN, supra note 52, at 40 (“Bradwell’s appeal was to be one of those [New Departure] high court cases.”); see also DuBois, supra note 46, at 28 (“[A]s Republicans struggled over the claims of the New Departure and suffragists grew hopeful,” Woodhull’s opponents introduced “her shady sexual reputation . . . to divert attention from the constitutional
arguments she made.”).
85
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 28 (“Suffrage leaders allied with Woodhull were either accused of sharing her ‘free love’ sentiments or warned against the consequences of associating
with disreputable women.”); see also CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 841–44 (describing the Woodhull “free love” scandal and its impact on the women’s suffrage movement).
86
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14 (“The prospect of women casting the ballot, which was both
a symbol and an instrument of independence, was troublesome to every man who feared his
wife’s (sister’s, daughter’s, etc.) partial freedom from male control.”).
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because their right to vote had been affirmed by the Fourteenth Amendment.87
During this time, women sought to register to vote in many communities around
the country.88 In some instances, groups of women showed up at the polls to cast
ballots, their actions indicating that they saw collective qualities in individual
rights.89 Although most election officials refused their votes, some officials were
persuaded to register them as voters, and some accepted their ballots.90 When
Congress passed the 1870 Enforcement Act, which allowed federal court action
against election officials who interfered with the suffrage rights of freedmen,
women began suing under the Enforcement Act those officials who refused to
permit women to vote.91 Even though federal courts were typically unsympathetic to these women’s lawsuits, the activists’ attempts to seize voting power
were sounding alarms across the country.92
This was the turbulent prelude to the issuance of the opinion in Bradwell.
The prelude was soon to become more turbulent due to the 1872 Presidential
election, a crisis for the Republican Party which had split into two.93 Ulysses S.
Grant was the incumbent Republican presidential candidate, but Republicans
concerned about accretions of federal power had formed an independent party
and nominated for president New York publisher Horace Greeley, an avowed
opponent of women’s rights.94 Suffragists, who like the freedman had come to
understand that the best chance for obtaining and protecting their rights was
through federal sources of power, campaigned for Grant, who tantalized them
with speeches vaguely alluding to more rights for women.95 When Grant won the
Presidency, suffragists felt that his administration would reward their efforts on

87

See DuBois, supra note 46, at 23–32 (describing women’s direct action voting that began
in 1868 and increased over the next few years, not only due to the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but also due to the 1870 passage of a federal statute, the Enforcement Act, that
provided federal court remedies when election officials reject citizens’ lawful votes).
88
Id. at 23 (“By 1871 hundreds of women were trying to register and vote in dozens of towns
all over the country.”).
89
Id. at 25 (“The voting women of the 1870s often went to the polls in groups.”).
90
Id. (stating that some election officials accepted women’s votes).
91
Id. 25–26 (reporting women’s use of the Enforcement Act in seeking authority to vote, and
the lawsuits women filed under the Act when their votes were refused, such that “[b]y 1871
numerous New Departure woman suffrage cases were making their way through the federal
courts”).
92
Id. at 29 (noting denial of the Enforcement Act claims of Sarah Spencer and seventy other
women in the District of Columbia in an 1871 court opinion that expressed fear of the social
and political turbulence that had already ensued following Reconstruction’s expansion of the
franchise).
93
Id. at 31 (describing the breakaway segment of the Republican Party in the 1872 election).
94
Id. (explaining the negative response of women suffrage activists to Greeley’s nomination
to run against Grant).
95
Id. (“[M]any New Departure suffragists campaigned actively for Ulysses Grant,” whose
Republican party “cultivated their support” and included “reference to ‘additional rights’ for
women in their [party] platform . . . .”).
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his behalf by granting them political and civil rights, including the right to suffrage.96
This was a miscalculation. Once in office, the Republican administration
shrunk from broad meanings of the Reconstruction Amendments.97 Deciding to
crack down on women who had voted, federal officers arrested the most prominent suffragist, Susan B. Anthony, on charges of election fraud because Anthony
had persuaded Rochester, New York election officials to let her vote.98 In what
appeared to be an orchestrated show trial with a pre-ordained outcome, Anthony’s federal trial was moved out of her home county and presided over by
Justice Ward Hunt, a recent appointee to the U.S. Supreme Court.99 Determining
that there were no issues of fact, only of law, Hunt took the case away from the
jury, directed a verdict of guilty—a procedure later deemed unconstitutional100—
and ordered Anthony to pay a fine.101 When Anthony refused to pay, the Grant
administration did not prosecute her for non-payment, effectively depriving her
of a public forum for a potential appeal to the Supreme Court.102 The message
was clear: the federal government did not support the New Departure arguments
for women’s suffrage.103
It was in this ominous context that Bradwell’s New Departure case, albeit a
non-suffrage case, would be decided by the Supreme Court. The Court had held

96

Id. (“[Susan B.] Anthony expected that if Republicans won, they would reward women with
the suffrage by recognizing the New Departure claims.”).
97
Id. at 32 (“In general, the outcome of the election cleared the way for the Republican party
to retreat from the radical implications of the postwar amendments.”).
98
Id. at 31 (reporting that for the 1872 Presidential election, Susan B. Anthony gathered others
with her, went to her polling place in Rochester, New York, and persuaded local election officials to accept her vote, along with the votes of fourteen other women. Anthony was arrested
a few weeks after the election).
99
Id. (stating that the change of venue for her trial and the appointment of Judge Ward Hunt—
who was soon to provide the fifth vote for the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases—to
preside over the trial served to reinforce suspicions that Anthony’s arrest and trial “had been
authorized at the highest level of government”).
100
See United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829, 833 (N.D. N.Y 1873); see also CHUSED &
WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 875 (describing Judge Hunt’s violation of the usual practice of
sending the case to the jury and instructing them on the law).
101
See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 877 (providing a transcript of the sentencing
hearing in which Judge Hunt fined Anthony $100 plus the costs of prosecution and Anthony
vowed never to “pay a dollar of your unjust penalty”). Norma Basch describes Anthony’s trial
as a “legal melodrama” and Anthony as “an eloquent martyr prodding the conscience of the
nation.” Basch, supra note 29, at 58 (“By casting herself as a modern Joan of Arc confronting
the full force and fury of the U.S. government, [Anthony] evoked . . . sympathy and press
coverage . . . .”).
102
Basch, supra note 29, at 56 (explaining that Judge Hunt’s directed verdict of guilty and the
Grant administration’s failure to prosecute Anthony for not paying her fine “crushed Anthony’s bid to bring her case up to the Supreme Court on appeal”).
103
Id. at 57 (“The outcry from friends of woman suffrage over procedural irregularities, coupled with the sheer political volatility of the Anthony case, may very well have pointed to the
need for a clear and authoritative judicial resolution.”).
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the case pending the outcome of the 1872 presidential election.104 After the election, there were fewer political costs for Republicans in rejecting the gender justice movement’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.105
C.   W(h)ither Privileges and Immunities?
1.   Bradwell’s Argument
Bradwell’s central argument was based on the unqualified language of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, which clarified that all Americans have
rights as citizens that the federal and state governments must respect.106 By its
terms, Section One forbids states from abridging the privileges or immunities of
citizenship of all American citizens.107 Most nineteenth century thinkers understood the privileges or immunities of citizenship to encompass the civil rights
found at common law and deemed sufficiently fundamental that they belonged,
as a matter of right, to the citizens of all free governments.108
Under this understanding of the privileges or immunities of citizenship,
Bradwell had a strong argument that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause protected her right to enter a profession.109 In the 1823 case
of Corfield v. Coryell, a citizen’s fundamental privileges or immunities included
“[p]rotection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right
to acquire and possess property . . . and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety
. . . .”110 Corfield’s litany of the privileges or immunities of citizenship echoed
through the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which guaranteed racial equality with respect to the common law rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”111 This
104

See DuBois, supra note 46, at 31 (“The Supreme Court held back its decision on Bradwell
until after the election.”).
105
Id. (“To trace the final judicial disposition of the suffragists’ constitutional arguments, we
have to understand what was at stake in this election . . . .”).
106
See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 133–37 (1872) (stating the argument for the plaintiff
in error, and elaborating the guarantees of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
107
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States . . . .”).
108
See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 21 (“The privileges or immunities of state citizenship were common law rights . . . and the Privileges or Immunities Clause forbade the
making of any law that abridged those rights of state citizenship.”).
109
See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 120 (“The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment opened all professions to blacks and must, [Bradwell’s attorney] argued, in the
absence of limiting language, also extend to whites, female as well as male.”).
110
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1823).
111
See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
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language evinces the nineteenth century understanding that a central injustice of
slavery was the denial of the fundamental right of all people to own their own
labor and to reap its benefits by contracting for gainful employment.112
The actions of the former Confederate states in enacting the Black Codes,
discriminatory state statutes that denied fundamental civil rights to freed slaves,
were rendered unlawful through the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which passed over
President Johnson’s veto.113 To prevent a future majority from repealing the federal civil rights statute, and to prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from striking it
down, Congress decided to constitutionalize the substance of the statute—which
in turn had codified an aspect of common law—through the Fourteenth Amendment.114 In the political bedlam that followed the Civil War, this was deemed the
safest course.115
Importantly, Congress chose language for the Fourteenth Amendment that
was more expansive than the language of the Civil Rights Act, removing its reference to race and protecting from abridgement the privileges or immunities of
citizenship for all classes of citizens.116 This expansiveness was deliberate.117
Congress had rejected an early draft of the Fourteenth Amendment that limited
its prohibitions only to discrimination on the basis of race.118 This history suggests that the Reconstruction Congress, while deeply concerned about racial inequality after slavery’s abolition, made a conscious choice to embed in the Fourteenth Amendment a wider set of protections and a broader anti-subordination
aim.119
112

See Smith, supra note 43, at 257 (arguing that the ideology underlying the Constitution’s
three post-war amendments was “the central importance of free labor as the source of all productive value” and that “every human being had a natural right to pursue his trade and reap
the fruits of his labor,” making slavery “the height of injustice”).
113
See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 27 (“Before the Fourteenth Amendment was
introduced, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed by Congress, vetoed by President Johnson
. . . and then passed again over his veto.”).
114
Id. (“The uncertain future of the Act was the most pressing reason for a constitutional
amendment. The idea was to give the Civil Rights Act of 1866 a more secure constitutional
footing and to immunize it from the attacks of future majorities in Congress. . . .”).
115
Id. at 28 (“[S]upporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 feared that even if the Act initially
survived judicial review, as a mere statute, it might be repealed by a future Democratic Congress or struck down by some future Democratic Supreme Court.”).
116
Id. at 6 (“[T]he words of the Fourteenth Amendment are general and are not confined to
discrimination or abridgements on the basis of race.”).
117
Id. (“The Constitution’s text alone is evidence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad scope
. . . .”); id. at 16 (“[T]he Framers’ use of broad language in Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment was no accident.”).
118
Id. at 32 (“The narrow scope of this proposed race discrimination version of the Fourteenth
Amendment caused the draft to be rejected . . . by members of Congress on the left who wanted
to prohibit all forms of caste . . .”).
119
Id. at 19 (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s legislative history in Congress and the ratifying
state legislatures confirms that the inclusion of language at a high level of generality was purposeful and was understood to be addressed to a broad problem. This history reveals that Section One was understood to ban class legislation and systems of caste . . . .”).
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As a matter of constitutional right, the Fourteenth Amendment applied to all
classes of citizens, who were understood to be equal classes before the law, extending across generations a principle of equality writ large.120 The Amendment
authorized federal power to invalidate discriminatory state laws and practices,
including those that treated whole classes of people as less than full citizens.121
Bradwell had reason to believe that the Fourteenth Amendment, interpreted in
light of this history, protected her right to a law license as a privilege of citizenship accorded equally to all qualified applicants and that the Supreme Court had
constitutional grounds to overturn the state court’s refusal to issue her license
because of her membership in a class defined by gender.122
2.   Analysis of the Argument
Unfortunately for those seeking equality, the Court retreated from the structural innovations of the postwar Constitution.123 This became apparent when the
Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases on the day before Bradwell.124 In construing the Fourteenth Amendment to uphold a monopoly on the slaughtering
business created by the Louisiana legislature and rejecting the challenge of a
group of independent butchers whose businesses were impaired by the statutorily
created monopoly, the Slaughter-House Court disregarded popular understandings of the Amendment and the common law, constricting beyond recognition
the apparent meaning of the privileges and immunities of citizenship granted unqualifiedly to all American citizens.125 Diverging from popular understandings

120

See EPPS, supra note 32, at 164–66 (“The Fourteenth [Amendment] begins by throwing a
national aegis of protection over all. . . . The tone of [Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment is] inclusive, universal, and comprehensive.”).
121
See Smith, supra note 43, at 259 (elaborating the post-war legal argument that “the [Reconstruction] amendments had decisively repudiated the states’ rights . . . views of citizenship
prevalent in the antebellum South, rendering national citizenship unquestionably primary” and
“based on the liberal commitment to securing fundamental rights against all threats, including
any from the states”).
122
Bradwell stated that she filed suit not to gain admission to the bar but to vindicate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s broad principle of equality. See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 115 (stating that Bradwell believed “liberty of pursuit was guaranteed to every citizen by the fourteenth
amendment, under laws which should operate equally upon all”) (quoting Myra Bradwell, The
XIV Amendment and Our Case, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 19, 1873, at 354).
123
See EPPS, supra note 32, at 169 (“That decision was not based on what the Constitution
said so much as it was on the idea that the Framers could not have really meant what they
said.”).
124
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81–83 (1872) (narrowly construing the protections of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in holding that a Louisiana
statute granting a corporate slaughterhouse monopoly did not violate plaintiffs’—a group of
independent butchers’—right to a livelihood).
125
See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 866 (asserting that in the Slaughter-House
Cases, the Court found that “[r]ather than being an expansive repository of new federal rights
as many had hoped, the [Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] just
gave to blacks the pre-existing [limited national rights of citizenship] held by whites”); see
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of the privileges or immunities of citizenship, the opinion drained the lifeblood
from the clause, “placed first among section one’s grand restraints on government,” soon after its birth.126
Ignoring the longstanding common law meaning of privileges and immunities as fundamental civil rights—including the right to a vocation—and ignoring
the Fourteenth Amendment’s authorization of federal power to prevent states
from interfering with those rights, the Slaughter-House majority, voting five to
four, stated that the Amendment’s privileges or immunities guarantee applied
only to those rights affecting a citizen’s relationship with the federal government
not the states.127 Whereas Congress had designed the Fourteenth Amendment to
restrict a state’s authority to maintain subordinate classes—including subordinate labor classes—and some of its drafters and ratifiers might have identified
constitutional infirmities under the Fourteenth Amendment of a state’s attempt
to exclude a class of people from a vocation, the Supreme Court’s majority did
not.128 This context—and other contexts emerging from the federal government’s
retreat from Reconstruction’s legal protections—provides support for the proposition that in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court betrayed the Fourteenth Amendment’s new promises.129
The obvious need to reorganize the operation of government after the Civil
War had led to a bold restructuring of the Constitution’s design, one that explicitly recalibrated the relationship between citizen and state and between state and
federal power.130 But seeing the extent of societal change that the Fourteenth
Amendment might support, in the highly charged atmosphere that followed its
adoption, some Congressmen lost their nerve, their taste for change, or both.131
also EPPS, supra note 32, at 166 (“The striking thing about . . . Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . is that it carefully does not limit any of its concepts to any racial group.”).
126
See Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: “Its Hour Come Round at
Last”?, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 406, 413 (1972) (“Unique among constitutional provisions,
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment enjoys the distinction of
having been rendered a ‘practical nullity’ by a single decision of the Supreme Court rendered
within five years after its ratification.”) (quoting THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 965 (Edward S. Corwin ed., 1953); see also BAER, supra note 28, at 259 (asserting
that “[t]he [Slaughter-House] decision effectively killed the privileges-and-immunities
clause” and the Court “has not overextended the [fourteenth] amendment; it has shackled it”).
127
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872) (stating that the Court would not interpret
the Fourteenth Amendment to impose federal rights on the states, because it would “fetter and
degrade” the states and “it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and
Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the people”).
128
See Smith, supra note 43, at 258 (“[T]he Supreme Court read the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments very narrowly, overruling interpretations grounded in the free labor ideology of
the governing Republican Party, out of an explicit concern to prevent the amendments from
interfering extensively with traditional state prerogatives.”).
129
See EPPS, supra note 32, at 169 (“The Fourteenth Amendment clearly changes something.
Courts have been stuck with the ‘federal rights only’ reading . . . .”).
130
Id. at 167 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment revolutionizes the membership of the American
Republic. . . . [then] radically alters its nature.”).
131
See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
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In other words, it was not just the Court that re-interpreted the original protective
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment within a few years after its ratification.132
Many decisionmakers balked at the boldness and breadth of the text of the laws
enacted in the early days of Reconstruction.133
When they balked, does that mean they altered or limited the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment? Although that is a matter of interpretive philosophy, it seems entirely fair to respond in the negative. The meaning of the text
does not change simply because its authors and ratifiers did not anticipate or
approve some of the applications of the text.134 Therefore, even though the application to women’s suffrage was one that some of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratifiers did not consider and did not relish, it cannot be denied that broad and
expansive words have broad and expansive applications in relevant situations,
even those not specifically envisioned by those who wrote and approved the
words.135 As Professor Stephen Calabresi has observed: “[W]e are governed by
the constitutional law that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wrote and
not by the unenacted opinions that its members held. . . . [S]ex discrimination is
precisely the kind of discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment
. . . .”136
After unleashing the democratic, egalitarian principles of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment, many Republicans sought to control how those principles applied in specific situations.137 Bradwell’s attorney, Matthew Hale Carpenter—a U.S. Senator, constitutional lawyer, and rising star in the Republican

132

See Smith, supra note 43, at 261 (stating that the Court’s narrow interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment “prevailed only by working in alliance with republican concerns for
states’ rights”).
133
Id. (stating that decisionmakers preferred arguments that “permitted them simply to defer
to the states, instead of explicitly endorsing hierarchical views,” enabling them to “evade, rather than directly oppose, the liberal claims of basic human rights that the ‘free labor’ ideology
of the amendments clearly advanced”).
134
See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 3 (“[I]t does not follow that the original meaning
of a clause or text is defined by the Framers’ original expected applications.”); see also
CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. VI:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, PART ONE 1301 (1971) (“[T]he particular application with which a general provision was identified at the outset should not so limit its future
operation as to produce a public inconvenience—notably when this would deny that perfect
equality of rights among citizens which the Constitution contemplates.”).
135
See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 48 (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s creators
knew well that their Amendment, once adopted, could be applied in ways contrary to their
expectations . . . .”).
136
Id. at 9, 14.
137
See FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 281–85 (providing a letter written by Justice Miller to a
relative in Texas that describes Republican efforts to control the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Smith, supra note 43, at 262 (observing that the Court “deferred to the
state’s republican powers of self-governance, in order to appear to confer equal citizenship
nationally while acquiescing in the creation of second-class citizens by the states”).
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Party—was among them.138 Disturbingly, Carpenter who argued for a broad understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Bradwell had also been engaged
by the state of Louisiana to argue for a narrow understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Slaughter-House.139 Whether it was despite or because of this
obvious conflict, Carpenter also imposed limits on his broad argument for Fourteenth Amendment protections in Bradwell.140 He told the Court that granting
women like Bradwell the right under the Fourteenth Amendment to pursue a
chosen vocation did not necessarily entail granting them the right to suffrage.141
Carpenter’s actions, manifesting an intolerable ethical conflict under current
professional standards,142 may represent the Republican Party’s determined efforts in the late nineteenth century to navigate volatile postwar politics and the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in ways perceived to best advance Republicans’ political standing and control.143 The patriarchal imagery of privileged
men making self-serving choices purporting to protect women’s interests presents an ironic backdrop to the substance of the gender equality arguments raised
in Bradwell’s case.144 It is unclear whether Carpenter consulted Bradwell and
obtained her consent to his assuming a conflicted legal stance and drawing lines
within his Fourteenth Amendment argument in Bradwell.145 Suffragists were angered by Carpenter’s manipulation of Bradwell’s New Departure claims to undermine the women’s suffrage position.146
138

See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 116 (“Forty-five years old, eight years at the Supreme Court
Bar, and a freshman Senator, Carpenter was one of the more famous American attorneys of
that time. . . . He was an acknowledged authority on constitutional issues . . . .”).
139
Id. at 118 (“While his theme in Bradwell’s case was the broad language of the amendment,
Carpenter’s argument on behalf of the monopoly slaughterhouse must have stressed the unintended ‘startling consequences’ of an expansive reading of the amendment’s language.”).
140
Id. at 120 (noting that Carpenter saw the language of the Reconstruction Amendments as
distinguishing the right to vote from privileges and immunities).
141
Id. (“[Carpenter] emphatically disassociated Bradwell’s quest for admission to the bar from
the campaign for women’s suffrage . . . .”).
142
See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 865 (“[L]awyers today could not simultaneously represent clients with such obviously opposing interests in the same court at the same
time.”).
143
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 39 n.47 (arguing that Carpenter’s arguments in SlaughterHouse and Bradwell, including his argument to exclude suffrage from the privileges and immunities of citizenship, while appearing to be inconsistent, were actually consistent to the
extent of “Carpenter’s determination, on behalf of the Republican leadership, to control and
limit the breadth of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
144
See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 131 (“[We cannot] know the effect of Carpenter’s conflicting
stances on the Court’s decision.”).
145
In December, 1871, Bradwell wrote to Carpenter asking about the progress of her case,
and Carpenter replied with a sloppy note in mid-January indicating that the oral argument
would be the next day—before she received his reply. See id. at 119 (“Evidently it was difficult
for Bradwell to stay in touch with her attorney at such a long distance . . . . Apparently, Carpenter had made his plans without any counsel from his client. In any event, he sent her a copy
of the brief only after it was submitted to the Court.”).
146
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 22–23 (“Carpenter’s position in Bradwell’s case infuriated
many suffragists, particularly Susan B. Anthony, who wrote indignantly to Myra: ‘Carpenter’s
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At the same time, Carpenter’s strategic judgment about the strongest posture
for Bradwell’s case—if made through a consultative process—was not wholly
indefensible. In the nineteenth century, the argument that the privileges or immunities of citizenship encompassed the right to practice a vocation was stronger
than the argument that they encompassed women’s suffrage.147 The right to enter
contracts to receive the benefits of one’s own labor had long been a principal
understanding of what the privileges and immunities of citizenship meant.148 The
distinction that Carpenter was drawing was between civil and political rights, a
common dichotomy of nineteenth century thought.149 Having constitutionalized
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and applied it to all classes of Americans, the Fourteenth Amendment, even when construed narrowly, should have protected at
least Bradwell’s civil right to choose a trade and enter a profession.150
Yet the political and legal connection between Bradwell’s New Departure
argument and the New Departure arguments of the women’s suffrage movement
likely impeded Bradwell’s chances of success.151 In the 1870s, the atmosphere
surrounding women suffrage was polarized and fractious.152 Even though nineteenth century jurists distinguished between civil and political rights, they knew
that upholding constitutional protection of women’s civil rights would lay helpful groundwork for a subsequent constitutional claim that the Fourteenth Amendment protected women’s ultimate political right to exercise the franchise.153 Unwilling to lend that incremental assistance, the Court deemed Bradwell’s
compelling civil rights argument to fall short.154
argument was such a school boy pettifogging speech—wholly without a basic principle . . . .’
”).
147
See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 11 (“The category of civil rights is broader and
more inclusive than the category of political rights.”).
148
Id. at 71–72 (asserting that the common-law rights incorporated into the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, including the right to make contracts and hold property, were understood “by the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to shed light on the meaning of that Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause”).
149
Id. at 71 (“[I]n the nineteenth century, it was widely accepted that there was a difference
between political and civil rights, including by members of Congress.”).
150
Id. at 6–7 (“Any law that discriminates or abridges civil rights to set up a hereditary caste
system violates the command of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
151
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 30 (“Bradwell’s case was closely watched by suffragists as
an indication of how much support to expect from the Republican Party.”); see also CHUSED
& WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 871 (“Bradwell’s attorney, Matthew Carpenter, spent a great
deal of time in his argument before the Supreme Court trying to convince the Justices that her
case was not a stalking horse for the suffrage movement.”); id. at 857 (“In many ways,
[Bradwell’s] case encapsulated the history of the post-War suffrage movement.”).
152
See supra notes 80–105 and accompanying text; see also Basch, supra note 29, at 57
(“Although the prospect of woman suffrage still met with savage derision in the press, it was
a viable reality.”).
153
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 30 (reporting Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s view of the Bradwell
case that “if women were covered along with men under the Fourteenth Amendment, wasn’t
the fundamental point of equal rights won?”).
154
See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 60 (indicating that in Bradwell, the Court “managed to resist the Amendment’s full scope”).
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Perversely, the wide scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s terms may constitute an important part of the reason that nineteenth century decisionmakers
engaged in concerted—even if legally questionable—efforts to apply its inclusive vision stingily. Undoing the hierarchies of the past is especially difficult
when all of those charged with the mechanisms of undoing must undo their own
hierarchical positions in the process. Standing at the top rungs of the hierarchies
of race and gender that were being challenged, it is no surprise that the feet of
Reconstruction era decisionmakers turned cold once the accompanying claims
of women and African-Americans revealed the extent to which true equality
would reallocate social power.155
Gender ideology, in particular, may have played a key role in turning decisionmakers’ feet cold and undercutting the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise.
The activism of women who read the Fourteenth Amendment as making them
fully autonomous political citizens startled those—like many of the judges and
members of Congress—whose entire lives, public and private, were thoroughly
structured around the nineteenth century’s gender ideology of separate
spheres.156 The prospect of upheaval in the gender relations that organized their
lives may have combined with other concerns to lead decisionmakers away from
a robust understanding of the universal language of the Fourteenth Amendment.157
Justice Bradley’s infamous concurring opinion in Bradwell, joined by Justices Field and Swayne, supports this understanding.158 Bradley, Field, and
Swayne had been proponents of a capacious reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in Slaughter-House but could not sustain their broad reading in
Bradwell.159 An explanation of this inconsistency lies in a commitment to status
quo gender relations, even though these three Justices—unlike the majority of

155

See BAER, supra note 28, at 111 (describing the “incredulous tone” of the privileges and
immunities decisions, which implied that “surely the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment
could not have intended to change the world quite this much. The Court did not entertain the
possibility that drastic fundamental change was just what the authors had intended.”).
156
See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 893–94 (observing that “longstanding opposition to suffrage . . . tapped into a powerful strain of antagonism in late nineteenth century
America to the demand by public feminists that women be treated as individuals fully equal
to men”).
157
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 30 (reporting Victoria Woodhull’s concern that “women
might be admitted to the benefits of the postwar amendments only to find those amendments
so narrowed that they bestowed virtually nothing”).
158
See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139–42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (asserting
that the right to a vocation is not one of the privileges or immunities of women’s citizenship,
because “nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman”).
159
See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 126 (“In a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Swayne
and Field, Justice Bradley set forth his own reasons why the Illinois judgment should not be
disturbed. . . . Men and women moved in different spheres due to the natural differences in
their respective abilities.”).
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the Court—expressed a willingness to use the Fourteenth Amendment, as intended, to strike down discriminatory state practices and alter the status quo in
American race relations in states across the country.160
The intellectual challenge of maintaining law’s resistance to equality for
women and African-Americans multiplied significantly after the Civil War, once
equality became constitutionally required by the Fourteenth Amendment.161 But
a judiciary composed entirely of privileged white men did what it could to rise
to that difficult challenge.162 They sustained their resistance for decade upon decade.163
The reasons to have waited until the mid-to-late twentieth century to outlaw
Jim Crow and Jane Crow are not found in law but perhaps in fear—fear of the
implications of unsettling status quo hierarchies by those who most benefitted
from them. White men in black robes grasped at arguments—many of them fairly
meager—that left white women and African-Americans subject to virulent discrimination of many kinds.164 Indeed, the twentieth century’s civil rights’ movements were organized in significant part around concerns that courts had spent
decades taking away from African-Americans, women, and other subordinated
people the entitlements and protections that the Fourteenth Amendment had
given.165 The Civil Rights movements of the mid-to-late twentieth century ultimately generated a second Reconstruction, at least in formal law, moving the

160

See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 83–130 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting) (stating that
the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protect the fundamental rights of citizens, including the right to lawful employment, from deprivation by the states).
161
See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 16 (“Any person reading these clauses [of the
Fourteenth Amendment] for the first time would immediately conclude that they mandate, in
some sense, ‘equality before the law.’”).
162
See Hernàndez-Truyol, supra note 5, at 41 (reporting that when Jimmy Carter became
President in 1977, “there were only eight women on the federal bench, with only one out of
ninety-seven on federal courts of appeal, making women less than 1 percent of the total federal
judiciary”).
163
See BAER, supra note 28, at 283 (“Over the years, those [lavish Fourteenth Amendment]
guarantees have shrunk, as Congress has rarely enforced them and the courts have timidly
construed them.”).
164
Id. at 105 (“The [Fourteenth Amendment’s] lavish grant of liberty and equality was narrowed into a guarantee of a few rights that were not, in fact, protected . . . .”).
165
Id. at 111–12 (arguing that due to narrow court decisions that “prevailed as law, though
increasingly shaky law, until 1954. . . . the United States remained a society of racism [and
sexism] under law, almost as if the Civil War amendments had never been passed”).
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country from Bradwell v. Illinois166 to Reed v. Reed167 and from Plessy v. Ferguson168 to Brown v. Board of Education.169 While these were welcome legal developments, the second Reconstruction, like its nineteenth century counterpart,
has shown considerable vulnerability.170
III.   LEARNING FROM LOSS
A.   Radical Inclusion
How should contemporary feminist thought take account of the interconnections between the anti-subordination movements of women and African-Americans and the legal theories they espoused? What lessons emerge from the equality struggles and defeats of the nineteenth century?171 What do these struggles
and outcomes teach us about the prospects and mechanisms for challenging subordination?
While these questions cannot yield straightforward answers, I start with a
suggestion that the overlap in the history of the struggles for race and gender
justice lends support to a radically inclusive feminist theory.172 As a correlate,
the overlap suggests that feminist principles, while speaking directly to structures

166

See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1872) (holding that a state’s denial of a
woman’s right to a vocation does not violate her privileges or immunities of citizenship under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
167
See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–77 (1971) (holding that a state statute automatically
preferring men over women as estate administrators is an arbitrary legislative classification
that violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
168
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding under the Fourteenth Amendment
racial segregation in railway transportation).
169
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that school segregation imposed by
the dominant group on racial minorities violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
170
See MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION vii–viii (2007) (comparing the
civil rights and black power movements of the 1950s and 1960s to Reconstruction, and highlighting the historical events in each era that led to the “continuous reality of black stigmatization, exclusion, and marginalization” that has “revers[ed] blacks’ hopes for a more inclusive,
democratic, racially just society”); see also BAER, supra note 28, at 106 (countering those who
suggest that “if the Court initially narrowed the Fourteenth Amendment, since 1954 it has
enlarged it beyond recognition” by observing that the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment interpretations remain “stingy and niggling”).
171
See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 845 (“Ignoring what is painful in woman suffrage history diminishes the capacity to build on its strengths by learning from past mistakes.”).
172
See Basch, supra note 29, at 52 (“[I]n the thoughts and actions of reformers, the constitutional avenues for ameliorating sexism and racism have run along closely related lines, and
perhaps nowhere more so than in the post-Civil War era.”); Calabresi & Rickert, supra note
78, at 53 (observing that while “[i]t would be an exaggeration to suggest that the position of
white women and slaves” was nearly the same, “[t]he point is that both groups had their options in life curtailed by law, making their abilities, merits, and desires irrelevant, and leaving
them to some degree at the mercy of the [white] men who benefited from their unpaid labor”).
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of gender, cannot be confined within gender borders.173 In fairness, this is not the
only reading of the nineteenth century struggles recounted here, as historical
events like these contain multiple contradictory meanings. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify in the history of the nineteenth century’s struggles for equality
the seeds of an intersectional feminism centered on women’s multidimensional
identities and challenges to subordination in all its forms.174
Contrary arguments are supportable as well. For example, although the overlap between the nineteenth century racial justice and gender justice movements
was considerable, there were times when historical events drove them apart.175
In particular, fissures developed between the gender justice and racial justice
movements when African-American men were enfranchised during Reconstruction and women were not, disrupting the solidarity that had prevailed through
wartime.176 One unfortunate result is that some suffragists opposed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments for supporting the enfranchisement of African-American men but not women of any race or class.177 This opposition severed the women’s rights movement, with a faction of suffragists supporting the
passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (in particular, those affiliated with the American Woman Suffrage Association) and another faction opposing it (in particular, those—like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony—affiliated with the National Woman Suffrage Association).178 The
accompanying arguments about Reconstruction constitutionalism made by some
women’s rights activists contributed to a perception that the women’s movement
was concerned primarily with the lives of privileged white women.179
173

See Smith, supra note 43, at 255 (“The antebellum era . . . witness[ed] the rise of a staunchly
egalitarian and liberal women’s movement, triggered by the abolitionist crusade and its revitalization of the ideals of the Declaration of Independence.”).
174
See Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, supra note 3, at 21 (“Beyond the recognition of multiple
forms of oppression, intersectionality provides a theoretical framework through which the law
can recognize and remedy those multiple oppressions instead of forcing a case into one distilled category of discrimination.”).
175
See Basch, supra note 29, at 53 (“It was to these flexible, indeterminate promises [of the
Fourteenth Amendment] that the radical wing of the women’s movement committed itself,
even as it contested the ratification of the amendment, jettisoning its old abolitionist ties and
setting the campaigns against sexism and racism at odds with each other.”).
176
See Smith, supra note 43, at 257 (“[A]bolitionism and women’s rights diverged because
many women refused to subordinate their claims to those of the freedmen, a subordination
evident in the failure of the postwar amendments to address female concerns explicitly.”).
177
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 20 (“Most histories of women’s rights . . . have emphasized
the initial rage of women’s rights leaders at the Radical Republican authors of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth amendments,” first for including the word “male” in Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment “defin[ing] the basis of congressional representation” and then for excluding sex from the “prohibited disfranchisements” of the Fifteenth Amendment).
178
See Smith, supra note 43, at 257–58 (describing the split between the National and the
American Associations of Woman Suffrage); see also CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at
830–45 (same).
179
See GIDDINGS, supra note 31, at 66 (detailing the racist rhetoric in The Revolution, the
newspaper of Stanton and Anthony, when discussing issues of women’s suffrage during the
postwar period).
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To my mind, these contrary interpretations do not undermine the fundamental insight that anti-subordination movements are interdependent and that antisubordination arguments necessarily cross boundaries from particular socially
defined categories into others. Understandably, suffragists who had fought for
years for women’s right to vote were disappointed that the Reconstruction
Amendments did not address women’s enfranchisement in so many words.180
But surely the needs for federal protection of freed slaves, male and female, who
were already experiencing brutal discrimination in the Confederate states and
beyond, were acute.181 Opposing these protections because they were incomplete
seemed, at the very least, insensitive to a profound and substantial issue of justice
as well as self-undermining of the related anti-subordination arguments that
women continued to need to promote.
Given this interdependence, the opposition of some women activists to the
Reconstruction Amendments produced unintended negative consequences.182
Not only did it split and thereby weaken the women’s suffrage movement, it
generated an uncomfortable posture for those who had opposed the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments for failing to enfranchise women in explicit terms
when they later found themselves arguing—with ample justification—that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment had enfranchised them nonetheless.183
Supporting from the outset any available anti-subordination tools—as some of
the suffragists did—served to promote solidarity across anti-subordination
movements, generate intersectional understandings, and strengthen the theory
and practice of equality writ large.184

180

See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 811 (describing the outrage of women suffragists that Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment “enshrined male voting privileges in the
Constitution for the first time”).
181
At an 1869 suffrage convention, Frederick Douglass powerfully expressed this view:
When women, because they are women, are hunted down through the cities of New York and
New Orleans, when they are dragged from their houses and hung upon lamp posts . . . when they
are objects of insult and outrage at every turn; when they are in danger of having their homes burnt
down over their heads; when their children are not allowed to enter schools; then they will have
an urgency to obtain the ballot equal to our own.

GIDDINGS, supra note 31, at 67 (quoting 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 382 (Elizabeth Cady
Stanton et al. eds., 1887)).
182
See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 845 (“Mainstream suffragists in the American
wing—the overwhelming majority—found the anti-Fifteenth Amendment campaign not only
politically unwise, but morally repugnant.”).
183
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 21 (“After the Fifteenth Amendment was finally ratified, the
suffragists . . . shifted from the claim that the Reconstruction amendments excluded women
and began to argue instead that they were broad enough to include women’s rights along with
those of the freedmen.”).
184
See Andrea Moore Kerr, White Women’s Rights, Black Men’s Wrongs, Free Love, Blackmail, and the Formation of the American Woman Suffrage Association, in ONE WOMAN, ONE
VOTE 61, 71 (Marjorie Spruill Wheeler ed., 1995) (quoting a letter from Lucy Stone expressing
the concern that “[i]t is not true that our movement is opposed to the negro. But it will be very
easy to make it so, to the mutual harm of both causes”).
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Of course, political dynamics played a significant role in driving a wedge
between the anti-subordination movements of the nineteenth century.185 When
decisionmakers recognized in the roomy language of the Fourteenth Amendment
the civil and political rights of African-American men—at least at first and at
least in principle—but refused the inclusion of women in that large constitutional
vision, they disrupted the linkages that promoted easy solidarity between the two
movements.186 Time and again, decisionmakers refused to see women’s equality
claims among the entitlements of all Americans, pushing the women’s movement away from their early intersectional arguments about the equality rights of
all.187
After numerous crushing blows, including Bradwell, women retreated from
their intersectional equality claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and developed another species of argumentation.188 They began asserting, for example,
that women’s differences from men made them especially important contributors
to political life.189 Difference arguments, such as those that underlay the emergence of cultural feminism, gained more political traction and helped women
achieve political equality through the Nineteenth Amendment, ratified at long
last in 1920.190
Necessity may well have played a role in inventing the politics of difference
feminism.191 But it moved activists away from mid-to-late nineteenth century efforts to emphasize the similarities between women’s struggles for equality and

185

CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 834 (describing the anti-black Democratic Party’s
pretense of supporting women’s suffrage in 1866, in an effort to split the suffrage movement
on racial grounds).
186
Id. at 811 (“The decision of most prominent male abolitionists in and out of Congress to
support the Fourteenth Amendment outraged a number of women suffragists” because Section
Two tied congressional representation to the number of male voters).
187
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 19 (describing the value of the women suffrage movement’s
initial universal arguments about equality in helping to “situate women’s emancipation in the
larger context of humanity’s freedom”).
188
See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 888 (“Given the religious, domestic violence,
and morality issues inherent in the temperance movement, it was not surprising that the equality-based rhetoric of the abolitionist movement and segments of the post-Civil War suffrage
movement ebbed away to be replaced by arguments about the special roles women could play
in politics.”).
189
Id. (describing “the growth of arguments for suffrage based on the higher moral standing
of women in American society,” an argument that “men began to accept” as “a basis for extending suffrage”).
190
For an historical analysis of the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment and the conservatism of some of the arguments in support of it, see generally Reva B. Siegel, She the People:
The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV.
947 (2002).
191
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 19 (“Here, in the post-Civil War years, we can see proponents
of women’s rights as they move from universal to particularistic arguments, providing us with
the Gilded Age equivalent of the shift from ‘equality’ to ‘difference’ in the feminism of our
own time.”).
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all struggles for equality.192 The nineteenth century’s intersectional approach had
focused on devising legal strategies to develop generous constitutional interpretations, aided by the new Fourteenth Amendment’s equality provisions.193 Because women’s rights activists did not succeed in this endeavor in the first wave
of feminism, the inverse became true.194 A miserly approach to Fourteenth
Amendment interpretation emerged from their litigation, with negative consequences for all who identified with any equality struggle.195
Indeed, there were cascading consequences of Bradwell. If a desire to protect
status quo power structures, including structures of gender, had provoked decisionmaking men to retreat from the apparent meaning of the privileges and immunities of citizenship protected by Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the retreat could not stop there.196 Once the retreat had begun, a narrowed understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment adversely affected other Fourteenth
Amendment claimants.197 Unfortunately, African-Americans suffered profoundly from the justice system’s constitutional retreat, as an enfeebled Fourteenth Amendment was not a sufficiently powerful basis for the federal protection that they desperately needed from the discriminatory commitments of the
former Confederate states.198
B.   Strategic Choices
These events counsel caution about the limits of legal strategies.199 Yet,
while it would have been foolhardy for subordinated groups to place their fate
192

See Smith, supra note 43, at 264 (“Egalitarian views did not completely disappear from
the woman’s movement, but they became less prominent.”).
193
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 27 (“[D]ebate over the feminists’ particular constitutional
arguments was inseparable from questions of the larger meaning of the Reconstruction amendments.”).
194
Id. at 34 (“With the defeat of the New Departure, winning the vote for women was no
longer tied to an overall democratic interpretation of the Constitution.”).
195
Id. at 29 (“[D]enying women the rights they claimed under general provisions weakened
those provisions in general.”).
196
See Smith, supra note 43, at 231 (noting the dynamics that led to legal decisions which
“buttressed the social composition and hierarchies preferred by more established citizens—
denials of citizenship, or conferral of second-class citizenship, on women and minorities in
ways that liberalism should logically have opposed”).
197
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 32 (“There is a link between the judicial dismissal of the
feminists’ New Departure and the larger repudiation of the postwar amendments.”).
198
See id. at 33 (“The rejection of woman suffrage arguments on the grounds that the Fifteenth
Amendment was only intended to forbid disenfranchisement by race paved the way for a reading of the Fifteenth Amendment that was so narrow it did not even protect the freedmen themselves.”).
199
The indeterminacy of legal doctrine allows it to be interpreted progressively or regressively, such that legal reform is limited in its capacity to undermine subordination. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1335 (1988) (“The civil rights community . . . must come to terms with the fact that antidiscrimination discourse is fundamentally
ambiguous and can accommodate conservative as well as liberal views of race and equality. . . .
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entirely into the hands of legal decisionmakers who were drawn exclusively from
dominant groups disinclined to identify and recognize their justice claims, it
would also have been foolhardy to abandon legal avenues, especially in the climate of profound political and legal transformation that followed the Civil
War.200 One critical meaning of subordination is that the disempowered are generally addressing their appeals to those who, unlike them, are empowered to decide.201 As fraught and challenging as legal strategies may be in this context,
subordination restricts the available tools.202 Moreover, as described above, the
women’s suffrage movement was active on multiple fronts using multiple tools,
such as campaigning for mainstream candidates, testifying to Congress, and engaging in direct action voting and other forms of civil disobedience.203 Their legal
arguments were part and parcel of a larger political movement.
During Reconstruction, their legal arguments were potent enough to take
center stage. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, speaking in expansive
terms to the rights of equality, actually could have embraced women’s rights far
earlier if only the political landscape had been somewhat more favorable.204 If
Lincoln had remained alive, if Victoria Woodhull had not been as vulnerable to
political attack, if Reconstruction and its legal underpinnings could have survived for a longer period—if only, if only—the fundamentally solid legal arguments of the late nineteenth century women’s movement might have prevailed.205
In the tumultuous political dynamics of post-Civil War America, those who
were treated unequally and asserted claims to equality needed a broad reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment.206 In this regard, efforts to secure autonomy and

[T]he victories [antidiscrimination law] offers can be ephemeral and the risks of engagement
substantial.”).
200
Id. at 1366 (“[E]ngaging in rights rhetoric can be an attempt to turn society’s ‘institutional
logic’ against itself—to redeem some of the rhetorical promises and the self-congratulations
that seem to thrive in American political discourse.”).
201
Id. at 1358–59, 1365 (“It matters little whether the coerced group rejects the dominant
ideology and . . . offer[s] a competing conception of the world; if they have been labeled
‘other’ by the dominant ideology, they are not heard. . . . The underlying problem . . . [is] how
to extract from others [what] others are not predisposed to give.”).
202
Id. at 1385 (noting “the limited range of options . . . [for those] deemed ‘other,’ and the
unlikelihood that specific demands for inclusion and equality would be heard if articulated in
other terms”).
203
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 20–23 (“[T]his episode in women’s rights . . . treats rights
. . . as something to be won and exercised collectively rather than individually; as the object
of political struggle as much as of judicial resolution . . . . Reconstruction was an age of popular
constitutionalism. . . . The New Departure took on meaning precisely because of this direct
action element.”).
204
Id. at 27 (“[S]ome of the leaders of the Republican party supported women’s rights claims
on the Constitution.”).
205
Id. at 34 (“The deepest mark of the New Departure . . . was to make women’s rights and
political equality indelibly constitutional issues.”).
206
Id. at 21–22 (observing that the suffragists’ constitutional strategy “embodied a radical
democratic vision”).
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freedom for women were inextricable from efforts to secure autonomy and freedom for African-Americans.207 Together these movements would rise or fall. For
generations, they mostly fell.208 Awareness of their legal linkages and of the similarity in the powers arrayed against them could have driven the anti-subordination movements into coalition.209 While for a variety of reasons this did not always occur, the substantive and strategic reasons to build coalitions were
discernable then—as, I would suggest, they are discernable now.210
When women’s rights activists in the nineteenth century deployed America’s constitutional discourse to challenge the structural inequalities that limited
women’s autonomy and women’s freedom, they drew on the emancipation arguments of African-Americans freed from slavery.211 Periodically, they showed
cognizance of the reality that the category “woman” included many who were
multiply oppressed by race, class, national origin, and other socially defined categories, glimpsing the connections between, and the complexity of, parallel liberation struggles.212 Sometimes they also showed cognizance of the reality that
insistence on equality, an important aspect of the women’s movement, was a
generalizable principle.213 Autonomy, equality, freedom—even when framed legalistically as the rights of citizenship—belonged to all human beings, placing

207

Id. at 22 (articulating the suffragists’ view that “[i]n the battle for the rights of the black
man, the rights of all had been secured”).
208
Id. at 30–31 (noting Victoria Woodhull’s observation in the early 1870s that “Republicans,
‘frightened by the grandeur and the extent’ of the amendments they had enacted, had retreated
to the enemies’ doctrine of states’ rights, where their own greatest achievements would ultimately be undone”).
209
See BAER, supra note 28, at 25, 90 (stating that joined by “the ease with which dominant
groups can exploit them,” the equality movements for African-Americans and for women both
advanced Fourteenth Amendment arguments, because “[t]he language of Section I, on its face,
was broad enough to protect women as well as racial minorities”); see also Smith, supra note
43, at 240–41 (“[P]atriarchy’s appeal is in large measure the same as the appeal of racial and
ethnic forms of civic inequality: all these hierarchies preserve a community order and identity
that the dominant white male citizens find more comfortable, particularly in times of change
and stress, than . . . egalitarianism.”).
210
See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 845 (“Consensus building, the choice of rhetoric, decisions about which issues to include or exclude, and other strategic questions are as
problematic to feminists today as those that confronted our foremothers.”); see also Smith,
supra note 43, at 264 (describing developments that undermined the suffrage movement’s alliances with working women, immigrants, and blacks).
211
See BAER, supra note 28, at 71, 73 (presenting historical evidence that “[t]he anti-slavery
theory of equality, derived from the Declaration and its belief that all were equally entitled to
rights,” was “enacted” into the Fourteenth Amendment).
212
See DuBois, supra note 46, at 26–27 (reporting Victoria Woodhull’s argument that the
disenfranchisement prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment implicitly included women, because “a race comprises all the people, male and female”).
213
Id. at 22 (explaining the “radical reconstructionist” argument made by the women’s suffrage movement that “[t]he war had expanded the rights of ‘proud white man’ to all those who
had historically been deprived of them,” such that “the benefits of national citizenship were
equally the rights of all”).
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the struggle for women’s rights under the spacious umbrella of other important
struggles for equality.214
The universal discourse of citizenship adopted in feminism’s first wave
linked women’s nascent autonomy claims to the autonomy claims of other subordinated groups who were challenging the unjust hierarchies embedded in nineteenth century American society. Coalitional needs and prospects, though only
partially realized, emerge from the dynamics of nineteenth century activism. In
a meaningful sense, this context breaks ground for the “intersectionality” and
“anti-essentialism” analyses that were yet to be framed.215
Hierarchy excludes many, and anti-subordinationists, feminists among them,
are joined in the fight to reconstruct social structures—including the legal system—to more fairly and equally allocate material and social power.216 Although
the Privileges or Immunities Clause was hollowed out by nineteenth century
judges, its anti-subordination language remains part of our constitutional inheritance.217 This inheritance poses a nagging question for equality movements not
only about what might have been, but also—given the right confluence of legal
strategy and jurisprudential will—what might still be.218

214

See Hernández-Truyol, supra note 5, at 51 (“Feminist judging liberates . . . all sexes, from
the intertwined subordinations of gender, sex, sexuality, race, ethnicity, class, religion, nationality, language, culture, and ability. Feminist judging embraces all people as fully human and
deserving of real equality.”).
215
See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 3, at 21 (asserting that intersectionality and
anti-essentialism are recurring feminist themes).
216
This result would fulfill the wishes of those like Chase Going Woodhouse, an early twentieth century feminist, who used to say that she hoped her tombstone could be inscribed with
the words: “Born a woman. Died a person.” See COTT, supra note 19, at 238 (describing the
desire among early feminists to leave subordination behind and to “break into the human
race”).
217
See Kurland, supra note 126, at 420 (“[T]here the clause is, an empty and unused vessel
which affords the Court full opportunity to determine its contents . . . .”).
218
See id. at 419–20 (arguing that the contents of the Privileges or Immunities Clause are
capable of revival, providing more substantive protections of adequate opportunities for all
Americans than do the concepts of due process and equal protection).

